

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHAL-1177-60

Copy 22 of 36

27 SEP 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Members U. S. Government CHALICE Community

SUBJECT : Project CHALICE, Revised Security Guidance in
Light of Events Subsequent to 1 May 1960

1. Events since the U-2 incident of 1 May 1960 require that the various Government agencies who have participated in the CHALICE mission receive revised security guidance. This paper outlines the present position concerning the security of Project CHALICE to assure that the flow of vital intelligence information will not be hampered by over classification and to provide maximum beneficial usage of certain CHALICE hardware previously restricted by CHALICE classification. It is not the purpose of this paper to authorize public discussion or statements concerning any aspect of the CHALICE mission or the U-2 incident. Such discussion or statements by military officers or Government officials will require coordination with the Department of State, CIA and USAF to assure that they will not be prejudicial to the United States Government's position.

2. By virtue of the 1 May 1960 U-2 incident and events subsequent thereto, the following information, previously classified under CHALICE, is now general public knowledge:

a. That the U. S. Government, and specifically CIA, between 1956 and 1 May 1960, was engaged in a program of over-flights of the USSR for photographic and electronic intelligence purposes, utilizing the U-2 aircraft, under cover of a NASA sponsored weather research program.

b. That Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960 undertook such a mission utilizing a U-2 aircraft based at Detachment 10-10, Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey, taking off from Peshawar, Pakistan, enroute to Bodø, Norway via Sverdlovsk.

c. That the operational capability of the U-2 aircraft is at least 70,000 feet altitude and 2,825 nautical miles (distance from Peshawar to Bodø via Sverdlovsk).

3. In addition to the above items which are now public knowledge, the following have been removed from CHALICE controls and classified ~~SECRET~~ in order to permit wider usage of CHALICE hardware by the U. S. defense community:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- a. Full performance characteristics of the U-2 aircraft.
- b. CHALICE intelligence collection hardware involved in the 1 May 1960 incident (B configuration camera, Systems 3 and 6, the Mark 30 anti-radar instrumentation and the drift sight. The tracker camera had already been declassified.) Details of contractual and development procedures involved in the production of this hardware, as well as its relationship to the U-2 aircraft, however, remain as CHALICE classified.
- c. Information in the following categories remains classified under CHALICE and should be handled in accordance with previously established CHALICE security controls:
 - a. Any CHALICE activity subsequent to 1 May 1960.
 - b. Extent of past CHALICE activity (with the provision that the COMINT may release certain product information in those instances where it serves the best interests of the U. S. defense community in a manner which will not divulge complete details of the U. S. intelligence community's substantive exploitation of the Project CHALICE mission).
 - c. All details concerning CHALICE operational concepts.
 - d. Details of official cognizance and approval of high U. S. Government officials of past and future specific missions.
 - e. United States Air Force participation in Project CHALICE including pilot recruitment procedures, reinstatement rights, SAG training and materiel support.

25X1X7

g. Host government authorizations and relationships.

h. Project contractual and development mechanisms and backstopping procedures, in addition to interrelationships of CHALICE suppliers (to include the processing facility at

i. Intra-United States Government relationships in Project CHALICE activities.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. In those instances wherein information is in such form as to be downgraded under the authority of this memorandum but classified by virtue of its application to some other special security system (double code word material), the classification of the other special security system will prevail.

25X1A9a

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Distribution:

- 1 - DNI Rep
- 2 - AFCIG-5, Hqs, USAF
- 3 - AFCIN
- 4 - OACSI, TB, CD
- 5 - State Dept., Dir, Intell & Res
- 6 - NSA
- 7 - JCS, CID, J-2
- 8 - Navy Dept., DuWeeps
- 9-32 - CIA
- 9 - DD/P
- 10 - Dir of Sec
- 11 - C/CI Staff
- 12 - C/MEDIV
- 13 - C/NEDIV
- 14 - C/FEDIV
- 15 - C/SRDiv
- 16 - OSI/SO
- 17 - PIC/SO
- 18 - OCI/SO
- 19 - Staff D
- 20 - DD/I
- 21-36 - DPD-DD/P
- 21 - AC/DPD
- 22 - Asst C/DPD
- 23 - Exec Off/DPD
- 24 - C/Admin/DPD
- 25 - C/DB/DPD
- 26 - C/Contracts/DPD
- 27 - C/Commo/DPD
- 28 - C/Ops/DPD
- 29 - C/Finance/DPD
- 30 - C/Material/DPD
- 31 - RI/DPD
- 32-36 - SO-DPD

~~TOP SECRET~~